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Firms must overcome agency and information asymmetry problems to make
efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions; this is particularly true for
firms with multiple units dispersed across geographic locations. Internal
communication and coordination may therefore be crucial in reducing in-
formation asymmetry and achieving efficient resource allocation. We examine
the relationship between corporate capital budgeting decisions and the degree
of internal information sharing using a dataset of 342 U.S. firms from 1993
to 2002. Information sharing is measured by the internal linkages observed
in firms’ research and development activities worldwide. The efficiency of
a firm’s capital budgeting decisions is measured by the deviation of the
firm’s estimated marginal q from the theoretical tax-adjusted benchmark. We
observe a significant relationship between value-enhancing capital budgeting
decisions and stronger internal linkages. Specifically, corporate overinvestment
is significantly reduced with better information sharing across units. All results
are robust to firm- and industry-level controls.
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1. Introduction
There are many reasons why firms may not invest at optimal levels.
Firms with more agency and informational asymmetry problems,
for example, make less efficient capital budgeting decisions (Durnev
et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2009). Information asymmetry problems
may be particularly acute for large multi-unit organizations, which are
often geographically dispersed and managed with relative autonomy.
With distance and organizational boundaries being significant barriers
of information transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Jaffe et al., 1993),
under- or overinvestment by the firm may result from inefficient
communication and coordination across various units. On the one
hand, if complementary assets inside the firm are not properly utilized,
valuable investment opportunities may be overlooked. On the other
hand, repetitive or inefficient investments may occur when managers
are unaware of resources available in other parts of the organization.
Note that this is not only a problem of larger margins of error
due to the lack of precise information; it can lead to consistent bi-
ases if managers do not take such communication inefficiency into
consideration when making investment decisions. For example, in a
multinational firm with horizontally diversified subsidiaries, managers
who are unaware of resources available in other parts of the firm—and
are not conscious of their unawareness—may consistently overinvest
from the shareholder’s perspective.
As market competition centers more and more on the development
of intangible assets, the ability to combine and recombine existing
knowledge represents the firms’ key competitive advantage (Kogut and
Zander, 1992; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). When crucial resources
within the firm become increasingly intangible, how to mobilize these
resources may have a significant impact on managers’ investment
behavior. In this paper, we examine whether efficient corporate capital
budgeting decisions are associated with intrafirm coordination and
collaboration in developing intangible assets, after controlling for other
relevant firm characteristics. We expect that, ceteris paribus, firms with
more internal information sharing may make more efficient corporate
budgeting decisions, particularly in organizations dispersed across
many locations.
Efficiency of capital budgeting decisions is examined from the
perspective of firm value maximization, using marginal Tobin’s q, the
ratio of the marginal change in market value to the contemporaneous
marginal change in assets. Theoretically, with declining returns to
investment, firms should continue to invest until the marginal return
of any further investment approaches zero from above, that is, when
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the marginal gain to the firm equals the marginal cost of investment.
The deviation of a firm’s estimated marginal q from the theoretical
optimal value of marginal q can serve as a reverse indicator of the
efficacy of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions. We consider a firm
underinvesting if it stops investing when its estimated marginal q is
still above the theoretical optimal level and a firm overinvesting if it
invests when its estimated marginal q is already below the theoretical
optimal level.
Thus, we apply a two-stage empirical framework. In the first step
we estimate marginal q for each firm as a coefficient in a regression. In the
second stage we use the estimated marginal q’s to form the dependent
variable, the deviation of the estimated marginal q from the benchmark
marginal q, which is then regressed on measures of internal information
sharing and control variables. We examine the separate groups of under-
and overinvesting firms to investigate whether there is a consistent
relationship between efficient capital budgeting and the presence of
information sharing channels, and whether these relations are similar
in the under- and overinvesting samples.
We use four alternative measures of internal information sharing,
utilizing information on firms’ patenting activities. We admit that
these measures are not perfect substitutes for each other, and that
each measure incorporates more dimensions than internal information
sharing, which is a concept that is intrinsically difficult to quantify. The
purpose of using four alternatives is to identify consistent relationships
not caused by a specific proxy. First, the self-citation ratio, defined as
the percentage of forward citations that occur within the firm boundary,
represents internalized knowledge transfers (Trajtenberg et al., 1997;
Hall et al., 2002) and thus the degree to which firms take full advantage
of their internal resources at various locations. Second, the nonlocal
self-citation ratio reveals the percentage of self-citations to patents
developed by researchers in other locations. Because information
asymmetry problems are most challenging for multilocation firms, this
ratio reflects the strength of internal communications channels across
branches or subsidiaries. Third, having researchers from different parts
of the world collaborate on the same project may signal the firm’s strong
interunit coordination and also promote future knowledge flows within
the firm (Zhao, 2006; Lahiri, 2010; Alcácer and Zhao, 2011). Hence,
we calculate the percentage of patents resulting from cross-regional
collaborations and use it as a measure of internal linkages. Finally, we
use the percentage of self-citations imposed by patent examiners to
proxy for the lack of internal information sharing. Although an inventor
may choose not to cite a competitor’s patents for strategic reasons,
failing to cite the same firm’s prior art is probably due to ineffective
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communication and coordination inside the firm. Therefore, we use the
percentage of externally imposed self-citations to measure the infor-
mation barriers in the organization, a countermeasure of information
sharing.
A sample of 342 U.S. manufacturing firms that filed patents during
the period 1993 to 2002 is studied herein. To the extent that research and
development (R&D) is usually one of the most centralized functions in
a firm, internal coordination and communication may be particularly
important to firms that engage actively in R&D. Although our sample
selection criterion may lead to an upward bias in the estimation of
marginal q and the estimation of information sharing, we do not
believe that these firms’ capital budgeting decisions necessarily differ
systematically from their non-R&D-intensive peers. We will discuss this
point further in the empirical section.
Our empirical results support the theoretical arguments. In gen-
eral, more efficient capital budgeting decisions are associated with
stronger internal linkages, and the effect is positively moderated by
the number of locations where the firm has R&D activities. The rest of
the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical
rationale for a relationship between efficient capital budgeting and
internal information sharing. The measures of investment efficiency
and internal coordination are outlined in Section 3. The data and
econometric methods are described in Section 4. In Section 5 we present
and analyze the empirical results and their implications. In Section 6
we present and analyze robustness tests using average Tobin’s Q as the
dependent variable. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Analysis
2.1 Firm Organization and Informational Asymmetry
Firms that face agency and informational asymmetry problems make
less efficient capital budgeting decisions (Durnev et al., 2004; Greene
et al., 2009) due to both intrafirm and interfirm conditions. Internally,
to make value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions, managers must
possess sufficient information about the organization, and their interests
must be aligned with those of the shareholders. Given that investors and
management may have asymmetric information, complex corporate
structures also may shield managers who pursue agency behavior.
For example, managers could deliberately mis-invest to entrench
themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), overinvest for empire building
(Jensen, 1986; Morck and Yeung, 1992), or be excessively risk-averse to
protect personal interests (John et al., 2008).
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Externally, to the extent that investors perceive there to be agency
or informational asymmetry problems, financing might be priced at a
premium (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The resultant liquidity constraint
could cause a firm to reduce the scale of its investment activity
(Himmelberg et al., 2002). Such concerns are particularly important
for multi-unit firms, which tend to have more complex organizational
structures and present greater agency and information asymmetry
problems to managers and investors (e.g., Graham et al., 2002).
A notable difficulty in multi-unit firms is that not all information
can be codified and transferred across units (Kogut and Zander, 1992;
Szulanski, 1996). The difficulty can be significantly compounded if the
units are located across distances, which could limit the interpersonal
interactions needed for knowledge transfer and interpretation (Jaffe
et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). As a result, two types of
inefficiencies may occur. First, when a decision is made at one location,
the manager may be uninformed of the resources available in other parts
of the firm. Fully aware of these information constraints, the manager
has to choose an investment level based on an incomplete information
set, which produces a larger variance around the optimal. The second
inefficiency could arise from managers’ ignorance or underestimation
of such information barriers. That is, the manager may be uninformed
of what is happening in other parts of the firm, and in addition also be
unaware of the incompleteness of their information set. As a result,
the manager may systematically overinvest in duplicative assets or
underinvest in complementary assets.
Although diversified firms in general face greater challenges
in internal communication and coordination, some of them possess
unique organizational capabilities that enable them to overcome such
challenges and make more effective investment decisions. For exam-
ple, multinational firms have long been recognized as a dispersed
innovation network, with the capacity to assimilate, generate, and
integrate knowledge on a global basis (Buckley and Casson, 1976;
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1990). Firms also frequently adjust their internal
allocation of resources depending on the local environments. Desai
et al. (2004) suggest that multinational firms appear to increase their
internal borrowing in countries with underdeveloped capital markets
or weak creditor rights. Feinberg and Gupta (2004) find evidence that
U.S.-headquartered multinational firms respond to high risks in the
host countries by increasing the extent of internal transactions among
subsidiaries. These organizational features may explain why some
multinational firms have stronger performance despite the challenges
of coordinating subsidiaries. Thus, understanding the sources of firm
heterogeneity is important to an analysis of organizational performance.
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In this study, we examine a particular dimension of firm
heterogeneity: the efficiency of corporate budgeting decisions in
multi-unit firms. Greene et al. (2009) observe that more efficient capital
budgeting is strongly associated with multinationality, but do not
provide an explanation for why this is the case. This paper intends
to identify a specific mechanism behind the efficiency, that is, whether
the efficiency of firms’ capital budgeting decisions is associated with
the coordination mechanisms that allow firms to alleviate agency or
information asymmetry problems.
2.2 Mechanisms of Internal Information Sharing
In a large, dispersed organization, business units or divisions are often
exposed to idiosyncratic challenges and opportunities in their respective
industries or geographic locations. They often have their own agendas
and interests, which may or may not be consistent with the firm’s
overall strategic goals. Firms therefore have reason to establish various
formal and informal channels for internal coordination (Gupta and
Govindarajan, 2000) to reduce coordination barriers and any related
dissonance within the firm.
This is crucial for efficient corporate capital budgeting, which
requires managers to use resources effectively at the organization
level. Given the intangible nature of information sharing, it is almost
impossible to capture the full spectrum of intrafirm communication
and coordination. However, for firms that engage in active innovation,
their patenting activities leave a valuable “paper trail” that can be used
to examine the otherwise invisible internal linkages (Jaffe et al., 2000).
Because many firms conduct simultaneously R&D in multiple locales,
and innovation is increasingly important for market competition, we
believe that information sharing in firms’ R&D activities is a good
representation of the overall levels of communication and coordination
inside the corporation.
One mechanism of internal information sharing is knowledge
flows inside the organization, especially across units or geographic
locations. Hall et al. (2005) suggest that internalized knowledge transfers
can lead to corporate competitive advantage and thus higher firm value.
Firms with good coordination mechanisms should be able to identify
and build on internal technologies better and faster than competitors.
For example, Zhao (2006) suggests that the ability to integrate internal
technologies enables multinational firms to appropriate value from
R&D even in countries with weak intellectual property rights protection.
Similar findings have been identified for firms conducting R&D in
highly competitive technology clusters (Alcácer and Zhao, 2011).
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The second mechanism that we identify is interpersonal collabora-
tion. Despite the development of information technologies, knowledge
spillovers remain locally constrained (Jaffe et al., 1993); even knowledge
transfer inside the firm boundary has proved to be challenging without
the right mechanisms in place (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski,
1996). Interpersonal relationships have long been considered an im-
portant mechanism of information sharing. Cockburn and Henderson
(1998) use joint publications between scientists in pharmaceutical
firms and researchers in publicly funded universities to measure the
connectedness of firms to the external environment. Similarly, Lahiri
(2010) uses co-patenting by semiconductor scientists as a measure
of intrafirm linkages. Presumably, having researchers from different
countries collaborate on the same project not only signals the firm’s
strong interunit coordination but also promotes future knowledge flows
within the firm (Singh, 2008).
Based on the above discussion, we argue that collaboration and
knowledge flow within firms can encourage communication and co-
ordination, thus improving the effectiveness of corporate budgeting
decisions in large organizations.1 In the next section, we describe the
empirical setup and the key variables used to test this relationship.
3. Model and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Marginal q
Firms derive incremental value from each investment they make, and if
the capital markets are well informed, this change in firm assets should
be reflected in contemporaneous changes in the firm’s market value.
Due to diminishing returns to investment, the firm eventually may
have a marginal investment project whose incremental value exactly
equals the incremental cost. Optimally, the firm should stop right here.
Marginal q is defined as the ratio of the unanticipated incremental
firm market value divided by the contemporaneous marginal in-
vestment. Therefore, the value-maximizing capital budgeting decision
would yield a marginal q of 1.0: a positive (negative) deviation of a firm’s
estimated marginal q from 1.0 indicates under- (over-) investment. Of
course, exogenous factors such as taxes may affect the capital budgeting
1. Note that in this study we focus on the effectiveness of corporate capital budgeting
decisions, which often, but not always, contribute to overall firm performance and prof-
itability. The link between internal coordination and profitability is less straightforward.
For example, some firms may promote competition, rather than coordination, among
subsidiaries with volume and performance-based incentives, which may lead to inefficient
use of resources but better profitability.
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process such that the optimal benchmark marginal q may differ from
the theoretical benchmark of 1.0.
Note that this is a different concept from Tobin’s Q (or average Q),
which measures market perceptions of the firm’s value. In the absence
of agency problems, internal information sharing can have the direct
effect of guiding firms to assess their existing assets before making
investment decisions, thus avoiding under- or overinvestment, but only
has a secondary effect on the quality or profitability of an investment.
Therefore, we believe that marginal q is a more appropriate measure of
corporate capital budgeting for the purpose of this study. For robustness
checks, we also examine the effect of internal information sharing on
the estimated average Q.
The methodology to calculate marginal q was developed by
Durnev et al. (2004) and was extended by Greene et al. (2009). The
marginal q of firm i can be defined as:
q̇i = Vi,t − Et−1Vi,tAi,t − Et−1 Ai,t =
Vi,t − Vi,t−1
(




1 + ĝi,t − δ̂i,t
) , (1)
where Vi,t is the market value of firm i at time t, and Ai,t is the total
assets of firm i at time t. Et–1 is the expectations operator, which uses
all information available to the firm at time t – 1. We substitute for
the expectations operator using r̂i,t, the expected return from owning
the firm and disbursements to investors; d̂i,t, the expected level of
disbursements from the firm (dividends, share repurchases, and interest
expenses); ĝi,t, the rate of expected expenditures on capital goods;
and δ̂ j,t, the expected rate of depreciation of the firm’s assets. See
the appendix for details of how we estimate the firm’s value (V) and
assets (A).




= β0,i + β1,i Ai,tAi,t−1 + β2,i
Vi,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ β3,i Di,t−1Ai,t−1 + δt Pt + ui,t, (2)
where Di,t–1 (or di,tVi,t–1) is disbursements to investors, including
dividends, share repurchases, and interest expenses. A series of year
fixed effects, Pt, are also included to reflect cyclical economic factors
that may affect all firms. The coefficient β1,i is firm i’s marginal q.
Because all four coefficients in equation (2) may reflect firm
heterogeneity, they are treated as random and estimated in the random
coefficient model as β̂ j = β + νi, j , where i indicates firm (1. . .I), and
j denotes the coefficient number (0. . .3). This yields an estimate and
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variance for each coefficient,β̂ j , and a series of firm-specific estimates
of each coefficient, β̂i, j . The estimated coefficients are then used to form
the dependent variables for the second-round testing, which will be
explained in Section 3.2.
Admittedly, the estimated marginal q (i.e., β̂1,i ) is susceptible to
noise in the data. For example, the change in investment may be
misestimated due to accounting errors, and the change in firm value
may reflect new information about prior investments. Moreover, while
theory suggests that marginal q should be estimated using continuous
time data in order to properly isolate the marginal investment made
by a firm, the accounting data used to estimate marginal q is never
continuous.
One caveat of marginal q calculation stems from tax considera-
tions. As explained by Durnev et al. (2004), the marginal investor in a
firm may face capital gains taxes, TCG, upon selling shares in the firm,
and personal income taxes, TD, upon receiving dividends from the firm.
Thus, instead of equation (1), the marginal q to such an investor should
be (1−TCG)(Vi,t−Et−1Vi,t)(1−TD)(Ai,t−Et−1 Ai,t) . Using this definition, we obtain equation (3), which
is analogous to equation (2).
Vi,t
Ai,t−1
= β0,i + q̇i,t 1 − TD1 − TCG
Ai,t
Ai,t−1
+ β2,i Vi,t−1Ai,t−1 + β3,i
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1
+ δt Pt + ui,t.
(3)
Thus, the estimated marginal q̂i will be q̇i · ( 1−TD1−TCG ), the previous marginal
qi times the relevant tax factors.
Using representative tax rates from the 1990s, the personal tax on
disbursements, TD, is approximately 33%; and the effective personal
gains tax rate, TCG, is about 14% (or half of the statutory rate of
28%, assuming that the marginal investor is tax-exempt half the time).
This implies that the estimated marginal q should be approximately
0.78 times the theoretical optimal value of 1.0.2 The deviation of a
firm’s estimated marginal q from this benchmark value is used as an
indicator of the efficiency of the firm’s capital budgeting decisions. More
generally, during this period the marginal investor would have faced
effective tax rates such that TD ≥ TCG ≥ 0 and the upper bounds on TD
and TCG were 33% and 28%, respectively, so a reasonable range of the
tax adjustment would be from 0.78 to 1.00. Accordingly, we conduct
all empirical tests using both estimated benchmark marginal q’s, 0.78
and 1.00.
2. It may not be realistic to gauge the impact from all possible biases. Durnev
et al. (2004) used a nonlinear technique to estimate this benchmark to be in the range
0.755–0.780, which is consistent with the back-of-the-envelope estimate detailed above
and used herein.
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3.2 Efficiency of Capital Budgeting and Internal
Information Sharing
We use four complementary measures to proxy for firms’ internal infor-
mation sharing. Because we emphasize the overall organizational capa-
bilities of firms, each firm—including all its branches and subsidiaries—
is treated as an integrated organization.
Our first measure is the self-citation ratio. Trajtenberg et al. (1997)
proposed the self-citation measure, defined as “the percentage of citing
patents issued to the same assignee as that of the originating patent,” to
measure the “fraction of the benefits captured by the original inventor.”
To capture information flows across locations, we also use the nonlocal
self-citation ratio, a specific variation of the self-citation measure that
tracks the percentage of cross-regional citations within the firm. Third,
to capture the importance of interactions among researchers at multiple
locations, we measure cross-regional collaborations, the extent of R&D
collaborations across units or geographic locations. The fourth measure
of internal information sharing is examiner-imposed self-citations. In a
patent application, the inventors are required to report any prior art
that the current patent is based on, and then the patent examiner—
who is usually an expert in a certain technological area—would impose
other citations that he/she believes appropriate. Although an inventor
may or may not cite a competitor’s patents for strategic reasons
(Alcácer and Gittelman, 2006), failing to cite the same firm’s prior art
is probably due to ineffective communication and coordination inside
the firm. Inventors who have self-citations imposed by examiners are
either (1) unaware of the internal knowledge stock or (2) unwilling to
acknowledge the contribution from colleagues, which may reflect less
than harmonious relationships among units. Hence, we calculate the
percentage of self-citations that are imposed by patent examiners, and
use it as a reverse measure of internal linkages.
There are two features about the four alternative measures that
are worth discussion at this point. First, the four measures reflect
information sharing from different perspectives, so they are imperfect
alternatives and do not replicate each other. Self-citation ratios cap-
ture the result of information flow while cross-regional collaborations
capture the process that may facilitate information flow. Meanwhile,
examiner-imposed self-citations can be affected by the scope of the
technologies and the patents’ strategic role in the firm (Alcácer and
Gittelman, 2006). As shown in the next section, these variables are
correlated in the expected directions but the correlation ratios are not
terribly high, which confirms our intuition. Second, these measures are
based on patents and related information. Patentable technologies are
among the most codified or least tacit part of the information set, and
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therefore easier to transfer across locations than other tacit knowledge.
Hence, we may overestimate the true extent of knowledge sharing in
firms that rely less on patents and other codified knowledge, which
should make it more difficult for us to find statistical significance in our
findings.
We use 0.78 and 1.00 as the benchmark marginal q’s, denoted
herein as h, in the empirical tests in line with the discussion on tax
implications presented earlier. Separate analyses are conducted on firms
that under- and overinvest, depending on whether (q̂i − h) is above or
below zero; (q̂i – h)+ and (q̂i – h)− are used as dependent variables
in the two subsamples, respectively. Thus, we examine the relation
between the extent of under- or overinvestment and the firm’s interunit




= α + λXi + ηCi + ωISI C + εi , (4)
where X represents the four alternative variables used to measure
internal linkages, and C represents the firm-level control variables.
ISIC are industry fixed effects that capture each firm’s primary two-
digit SIC code. Finally, we assume that the disturbance term, εi , is
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance σ 2. As in
Greene et al. (2009), we use a Saxonhouse (1976) technique to weigh all
observations by the inverse of the standard error associated with the
estimate of marginal q, then use a weighted truncated regression model
to conduct separate examinations of under- and overinvesting firms
using equation (4). Because the truncated variance is between 0 and
1, the marginal effect of each variable may be smaller than that of the
corresponding coefficient (Greene, 2003). Because h can assume either
of two values, 0.78 or 1.00, we estimate equation (4) four times for each
set of independent variables—that is, for the under- and overinvesting
subsamples defined relative to 0.78 and 1.00.
4. Data and Variables
In this section, we report our sample and data sources, as well as
variable construction. Details of the marginal q estimation procedure
are reported in the appendix.
4.1 Data Sample and Sources
To estimate marginal q we must have reliable numbers on a firm’s
market value and assets. We use all data that can be matched across three
datasets—Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat
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Merged Database (Compustat),3 CRSP Daily Stocks Database (CRSP),
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)—using the Directory
of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) as a link when possible. Our sample
period begins with 1993 because this is the first year for which DCA
data is available in electronic format. Because our patent data end in
2006, and it may take years for a patent to go through the application
pipeline, ending the sample period in 2001 should allow enough of
an observation window for innovations to be captured by the patent
data. Our marginal q estimates, which form the basis of the dependent
variable in the second-stage regressions, are obtained using Compustat
data from 1993–2002; and the independent variables in the second-stage
regression, firm innovation and controls, are created using data for the
years 1993–2001.
To obtain information on each firm’s innovation activity, we first
match company names in the Compustat data—which are typically
parent companies—to the names in the DCA. The purpose is to rely
on the affiliation information in the DCA to create a “family tree” for
each firm, so that the analyses are conducted at the organizational level,
inclusive of all the branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures in which
the firm has a decisive stake. Next, we match the names of all family
members to the patent assignees as documented by the USPTO. For
those firms without a match in the DCA, we directly match the firm
name from Compustat to the patent assignees as documented by the
USPTO.
We acknowledge that firms with patenting activities may not
represent all multi-unit firms, which potentially introduces two sources
of selection bias to our analysis. First, given that R&D is likely to be
one of the most centralized functions in a firm, information sharing
may be particularly important in R&D-intensive firms. Second, to the
extent that R&D-intensive firms find it harder to raise external capital
because they are more difficult for outsiders to understand and thus
value properly, they are more likely to face liquidity constraints, hence
a higher estimated marginal q. So we may see more underinvesting
firms than we would in the general population of firms. However,
despite having possibly higher measures of information sharing and of
marginal q, we believe that these firms are not systematically different
from other firms in terms of their reliance on internal coordination. In
the semiglobalized world with significant differences across countries
(Ghemawat, 2003), centralization is not always the optimal choice;
3. The CRSP data are reported on a calendar year basis, and the Compustat data
are reported on a fiscal year basis. To keep consistency across sources, if the firm’s
fiscal year ends in January–May (June–December), we use the data covering fiscal years
1992–2001(1993–2002).
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the integration-responsiveness framework proposed by Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1989) is still highly relevant to today’s “high-tech” and “low-
tech” firms alike. High-tech wireless telecommunications companies
need location-specific investments catering to local customers, while
low-tech manufacturers or retailers who count on standardization to
achieve lower costs may find intrafirm coordination crucial to their
competitiveness. That is, there is no evidence that firms engaged in
patenting activities are special in the information–investment relation-
ship we address in this paper.
Several sample filters are used to make sure that the firm’s
accounting data are stable, and that noisy and extreme values are
excluded. Our results are robust to variations in the thresholds. First, we
use only U.S.-headquartered, U.S.-incorporated manufacturing firms
(i.e., SIC codes 2000–3999) for which five or more consecutive years of
data are available from Compustat. When Compustat reports a value as
“insignificant” we set it to zero. To avoid duplication, we remove entries
for preferred stock, class B stock, and the like by discarding entries
whose CRSP Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures
(CUSIP) issue number begins with numbers other than 10 or 11.
Second, several criteria are applied to ensure that the equity
market variables are reliable. We include only firms with tangible assets
of at least $1 million to eliminate firms that may not have the financial
means to pursue a coordinated R&D strategy. Meanwhile, we exclude
all firm-year observations when a firm’s stock was traded on fewer than
60 days per year (slightly above the first percentile of the distribution,
or roughly one in every four trading days), share price was less than
$1, or the estimated average Tobin’s Q was above 5.0. Also excluded are
firm-year observations in which the firm’s value, total assets, or tangible
assets changed by more than 300% in absolute value.
Finally, a firm is included in the sample if and only if it has at least
three patents with the USPTO in a 3-year period. Note that this step
may introduce selection bias in the sense that not all manufacturing
firms file patents. However, we decide to take this step for two
reasons. First, innovative firms with significant intellectual assets are
the ones facing the most serious coordination challenges. Second, most
of the multi-unit firms in the Compustat data are large firms with
multiple patents in the sample period, so the threshold is not too
discriminating.
This yielded a dataset with 367 firms with estimates of marginal q
ranging from –0.37 to 4.21. Because the extreme estimates of marginal q
were both significantly different from the mean and difficult to interpret
economically, we exclude from analysis all firms for which the estimated
marginal q was more than two standard deviations away from the mean;
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this cost 22 observations.4 We also included only those firms for which
there were two or more other firms also in their industry as measured
using the two-digit SIC industry code. The resultant dataset contains
342 manufacturing firms in 16 two-digit SIC industries.
The 342 firms in the sample collectively generated 182,203 patents
in the sample period, with annual patent output ranging from one to
2,865 for each firm. We rely on the front-page information on the patent
applications to identify the detailed address of every single inventor.
Following the innovation literature (e.g., Chung and Alcácer, 2002;
Singh, 2008), a region is defined as a state in the United States or a
country in the rest of the world. This generates 139 unique regions in
our sample, including all 50 U.S. states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico,
and 85 foreign countries. The number of locations with R&D activities
ranges from 1 to 55.
4.2 Variables
We follow the Durnev et al. (2004) procedure to construct the dependent
variable, marginal q. On average, the mean estimated marginal q is 0.94,
suggesting that firms overinvest relative to the theoretical benchmark
marginal q, 1.0, but not the tax-adjusted benchmark marginal q, 0.78
(see Table I). What interests us is the significant variation around the
mean (from –0.16 to 2.19), which we try to explain using the degree of
information sharing inside the firm.
To calculate the self-citation ratio for each patent in our sample,
we pull out all the patents that have cited a focal patent after its grant
date, and examine whether the assignees belong to the same firm. The
ratio of self-citations to the total number of citations is considered the
self-citation ratio of the focal patent, and is averaged at the firm level.
Because we are interested in firms as integrated organizations, any
citations among affiliated organizations are considered self-citations.
Consistent with the literature, the average self-citation ratio in our
sample is 14.0%, and the number drops to 2.4% if we only consider self-
citations that occur across intrafirm units located in different regions
(i.e., the nonlocal self-citation ratio).
Next, patents with inventors from at least two different regions are
considered the result of cross-regional collaborations. We then divide
4. Nineteen of these 22 observations were firms with high estimated marginal q’s (i.e.,
underinvesting firms). It is unclear why we did not observe a symmetric distribution of
outlier marginal q’s. We do not know if this reflects internal problems such as poorly
functioning information sharing channels or external problems such as greater financial
constraints. It may stem from our sample selection criterion whereby we include only
firms with patenting activities during the time period, and high-tech firms tend to face
bigger challenges in obtaining external financing.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Budgeting and Information Sharing 1151
the number of such patents by the total number of patents filed by each
firm in each year. It turns out that 17.7% of the patents are the result
of cross-regional collaborations, and despite significant cross-industry
variations, this percentage generally increases over time.
The variable examiner-imposed self-citations is calculated for a re-
duced sample of patent citations. Because the information on examiner-
imposed versus inventor-listed citations was not available until January
1, 2001, patents granted before that date are removed from the sample.
For each focal patent, we divide the number of examiner-imposed self-
citations by the number of all self-citations. 48.0% of the citations are
imposed by examiners. Examiner-imposed citations constitute a large
percentage among self-citations as well as all citations, but the ratio
of examiner-imposed self-citations has a much higher variance across
firms.
We include a series of firm-level variables as controls. First, making
sound investment decisions is particularly challenging when the firm’s
R&D activities are geographically dispersed. Therefore, we also count
the number of regions where the firm has innovative activities.5 Control-
ling for the number of regions is important for another reason. Because
all our independent variables reflect aspects of cross-regional ties, they
are likely to be correlated with the firm’s geographic dispersion of
operations. We want to make sure that the internal linkage variables do
not just pick up the effects of globalization on market capitalization. For
robustness checks, we also use the number of countries in which a firm
has innovative activities in order to differentiate more cleanly between
firms that conduct innovation at multiple places within an individual
country and firms that conduct innovation in multiple countries.6
Second, firm size matters. Larger firms are likely to have greater
internal financing capabilities, and thus are less constrained by capital
when seeking valuable investment projects. However, larger firms
tend to face more challenging coordination tasks. They also may
have explored most of the profitable investment opportunities and are
therefore more likely to overinvest (Jensen, 1986). Firm size is measured
as the log of average property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over the
time period. Because we are examining innovating firms, we also use
the logarithm of the total number of patents that a firm filed in the past
3 years to reflect its overall innovation clout, and use the average number
5. Admittedly, the geographic dispersion of R&D may well be endogenous, deter-
mined by the firms’ globalization strategies and their intrinsic organizational capabilities.
Addressing the choice of organizational structure is beyond the scope of this paper.
6. Because U.S. firms are not required to disclose overseas revenues or sales, it is not
feasible to use accounting based measures to proxy accurately for a firm’s multinationality.
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of citations received by each patent to reflect the value of inventions in
every sample firm.
Firms’ financial conditions also may affect their budgeting de-
cisions. Firms with high cash flow may be more prone to overinvest
(Jensen, 1986), while firms with low cash flow may conserve resources
for future usage (Himmelberg et al., 2002). Cash flow is measured as the
ratio of the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation
and amortization to tangible assets. We also control for leverage, which
is measured as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and current
liabilities to total assets. Although highly leveraged firms may face
greater financing constraints and have less leeway to invest because
of the bankruptcy threat (Myers, 1977), they also may be subject to
greater corporate governance oversight and therefore make more value-
enhancing investments (Jensen, 1986). In robustness tests we also use
liquidity, the difference between current assets and current liabilities
divided by tangible assets, to depict the firm’s current financial standing.
Finally, we control for corporate industrial diversification. Diver-
sified firms are more likely to be cash rich and have internal capital
markets of their own (Stein, 1997). Yet, diversified firms are also
more complex and present greater agency and information asymmetry
problems to managers and investors.7 Firm diversification is measured
as the average number of different two-digit segments that are reported
in Compustat Industry Segment Data (SSIC2). Although this measure is
a noisy proxy of firm diversification, it remains the best choice available
in many circumstances and is used widely in the literature (e.g., Linck
et al., 2008).
In addition, industry-specific characteristics may cause firms in
certain industries to make more or less efficient capital budgeting deci-
sions systematically. Two-digit industry fixed effects, SSIC, are therefore
included in our analysis of capital budgeting decisions. Moreover,
macroeconomic factors may cause marginal q to be estimated with
greater noise in some years. This concern is addressed through the use
of year fixed effects and random coefficient estimation of marginal q.
Table I lists the definitions and univariate statistics for the above-
mentioned variables, and Table II reports the correlation matrix. In
Table III we present the industry composition of firms in the dataset.
7. Admittedly, diversification is not the only, or best, proxy for firm complexity.
For example, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) construct a complexity index based on the
input–output table across industries. However, this complexity index is estimated at the
industry level and will be automatically dropped out when we add the industry dummy.
We acknowledge our data constraints, which prevent us from constructing a complexity
index to capture the firm heterogeneity we hope to examine in this paper.
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Table III.
Industry Composition of Firms in Dataset
Two-Digit Industry Number of Mean Estimated
SIC Code Name Firms Marginal q
20 Food and kindred products 15 0.87
22 Textile mill products 6 1.00
25 Furniture and fixtures 8 0.86
26 Paper and allied products 19 0.88
27 Printing, publishing and allied industries 7 0.71
28 Chemicals and allied products 49 0.92
29 Petroleum refining and related industries 10 0.75
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 12 1.04
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 6 0.90
33 Primary metal industries 12 0.71
34 Fabricated metal products, except
machinery and transportation equipment
18 0.80
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and
computer equipment
52 0.96
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment
and components, except computer
equipment
44 0.97
37 Transportation equipment 33 0.97
38 Measuring, analyzing, and controlling
instruments; photographic, medical and
optical goods; watches and clocks
44 1.08
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 7 0.98
Notes: This table reports the number of firms in our dataset in each two-digit SIC code classification. We exclude from
analysis all industries in which we obtain estimated marginal q’s for fewer than three firms.
The best-represented industry is “industrial and commercial machinery
and computer equipment” (two-digit SIC code 35) with 52 firms.
5. Results
It is unclear a priori whether information-sharing channels would have
a symmetric effect on the efficiency of capital budgeting among under-
and overinvesting firms. Essentially, there are two possible mechanisms
affecting the relationship between capital budgeting decisions and
information sharing. On the one hand, the inefficiency in firms’ capital
budgeting decisions may stem entirely from information asymmetry.
In that case, we would observe a large margin of error with symmetry
on the over- and underinvestment sides, and a pooled analysis of all
sample firms would be in order. On the other hand, the inefficiency
may be due to managers not knowing their lack of information and
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Table IV.
Descriptive Statistics For Under-
and Overinvesting Firms
Firms Firms T-Test Firms Firms T-Test
for which for which of the for which for which of the
q̂i > 0.78 q̂i ≤ 0.78 Means q̂i > 1.00 q̂i ≤ 1.00 Means
Marginal q 1.14 0.55 23.77∗∗∗ 1.29 0.69 22.56∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.18) (0.25) (0.22)
Locations 7.00 8.37 −1.34 5.76 8.66 −3.34∗∗∗
(8.04) (9.48) (6.45) (9.62)
PPE 5.75 6.45 −3.28∗∗∗ 5.49 6.35 −4.17∗∗∗
(1.91) (1.85) (1.90) (1.85)
Diversification 1.63 1.83 −1.98∗∗ 1.59 1.78 −2.06∗∗
(0.78) (0.93) (0.75) (0.89)
Notes: This table describes the basic characteristics of firms that under- or overinvest. The table reports means, with
standard deviations in parentheses.
behaving as if they knew. For example, for firms with parallel operations
in multiple countries, information sharing will significantly increase
efficiency in the overinvesting camp but not in the underinvesting one.
This asymmetric effect justifies separate analyses of the under- and
overinvesting firms.
In Table IV, we compare the main characteristics of over- and
underinvesting firms, and find that they are systematically different
from each other. The overinvesting firms are significantly larger in terms
of assets, and they are more diversified geographically and industrially.
We therefore decide to examine these two groups of firms separately.
The results of separate analyses of the efficiency of capital bud-
geting decisions of under- and overinvesting firms are reported in
Tables V and VI. If a particular measure of internal coordination has
a symmetric effect on these two groups, then it would have opposite
signs in the analyses (e.g., negative in Table V and positive in Table VI).
However, if a particular measure has the same effect on all firms—for
example, leading to lower levels of investment across the board—then
it would have the same sign in both subsamples and yet have different
interpretations.
5.1 Impact of Internal Coordination
and Communication
We first explore the connection between capital budgeting and overall
self-citation ratios. We then zoom in on the self-citations that happen
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across geographic locations, and use nonlocal self-citation ratio as
our key independent variable. Next, we examine the link between
value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions and R&D collaborations
among inventors from multiple regions as well as examiner-imposed
self-citations. For each of our focal independent variables we run three
sets of empirical tests versus each of the two benchmark marginal q’s,
0.78 and 1.00. In each set we examine (1) a baseline model using the focal
variable, (2) an expanded version including also the number of locations
with patenting activities, and (3) a fuller version in which we also
control for the average citations received by each patent.8 Results for the
underinvestment sample defined against the tax-adjusted benchmark
marginal q’s of 0.78 and 1.00 are presented in Tables Va and Vb,
respectively; the comparable charts for the overinvestment sample are
presented in Tables VIa and VIb, respectively.
Although the link between efficient capital budgeting and self-
citations is statistically insignificant among firms that underinvest
(Tables Va and Vb, Models 1–3), it is mostly significant among firms
that overinvest (Tables VIa and VIb, Models 1–3), which suggests
that repetitive, wasteful investment is reduced when there is greater
information sharing within the firm. Nonlocal self-citations indicate
the degree to which innovators within the firm build on technologies
developed in other parts of the firm, and higher levels of nonlocal self-
citations could indicate better information sharing. Our examination of
overinvesting firms reveals that capital budgeting decisions are more
effective when a firm has higher levels of nonlocal self-citations (Tables
VIa and VIb, Models 4–6). The result is stronger after we control for the
number of locations in the firm.
As with the broad self-citation measure, nonlocal self-citation ratio
has an insignificant impact on capital budgeting among underinvesting
firms (Tables Va and Vb, Models 4–6). One possible explanation is
that the geographically dispersed corporate units (e.g., subsidiaries)
are more substitutes rather than complements for each other. When
units are substitutes, better information sharing could reduce redundant
investments. When units are complements, better information sharing
may encourage value-enhancing investments to take advantage of
the complementary resources scattered in the firm. We observe more
support for the hypothesis of substitutive units.
Among firms that overinvest, interpersonal collaboration across
regions turns out to be an effective means of reducing coordination costs
and strengthening information sharing in geographically dispersed
8. We run all tests separately among under- and overinvesting firms defined sepa-
rately versus the two benchmark marginal q’s, 0.78 and 1.00. Thus, two rounds of tests,
where each round includes 2 sets of three models, yield a total of 12 sets of results.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Capital Budgeting and Information Sharing 1161
organizations (Tables VIa and VIb, Models 7–9). We find that firms
make more value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions with higher
proportion of R&D conducted in multilocation teams; this directly
parallels the results reported earlier for the nonlocal self-citation ratio.
We also find that among firms that underinvest, the efficiency of their
capital budgeting decisions is inconsistently affected by multiregional
collaboration on patents. When we evaluate the efficiency of firms’ cap-
ital budgeting decisions versus the tax-adjusted benchmark marginal q
of 0.78, we find that the efficiency is worsened by such multiregional
collaboration (Table Va, Models 7–9) but we find no relationship when
we evaluate efficient capital budgeting decisions versus the no tax
benchmark marginal q of 1.00 (Table Vb, Models 7–9). This result
injects a degree of nuance into how we can interpret our results. It
may be the case that extensive cross-regional collaborations, while
facilitating information sharing within the firm, also inhibit the firm’s
integration into the local economy (Zhao and Islam, 2008). This limits
the subsidiaries’ access to local resources or local market opportuni-
ties, thus forgoing valuable investments that should have happened.
Therefore, we see that the multiregion ratio is positive and statistically
significant in nearly all tests, among both under- and overinvesting
firms.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the percentage of self-citations im-
posed by patent examiners can be interpreted as a reverse measure of
internal information sharing; it reveals the degree to which innovators
are unaware of their colleagues’ R&D activities. Of course, this is based
on the assumption that the patent examiner knows exactly what should
have been listed as prior art and acts objectively. Because this measure
is available only for 2001 onward, we examine a smaller number of
firms in this set of regressions (307 vs. 342 in our other tests). This
result is statistically significant in only 4 of the 12 cases we examine
(Tables Va, Vb, VIa, and VIb, Models 10–12). It shows that all firms
invest less when they have higher levels of examiner-imposed self-
citations. This results in less efficient capital budgeting decisions for
underinvesting firms and more efficient capital budgeting decisions for
overinvesting firms, which is counterintuitive. In other words, firms that
underinvest leave good projects unexplored while firms that overinvest
encounter speed bumps and invest less. One may argue that firms
with high levels of examiner-imposed self-citations are not the most
resourceful in organizing their global R&D activities, which suppresses
the overall level of R&D investments.
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5.2 Control Variables
Although geographic dispersion could drive up coordination costs,
there is evidence that multinational firms make more efficient capital
budgeting decisions (Greene et al., 2009) and have stronger managerial
skills (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen,
2011). Further, Brown and Medoff (1989) found that larger, more com-
plex firms may be able to recruit and retain higher-quality employees.
Thus, it is not surprising that we find no relationship between the
efficiency of a firm’s capital budgeting decisions and the number of
locations where a firm conducts R&D. Also, we generally observe no
relation between the efficacy of corporate capital budgeting decisions
and firm size.
Firms that conduct more R&D may have more centralized organi-
zational structures. On the other hand, they may face more information
asymmetry between managers and investors, who find it difficult to
evaluate effectively the intrinsic value of the firm’s innovations. Such
firms are also more likely to face liquidity constraints and have to rely
on internal cash flows to finance investments. We find only limited
evidence (Tables Vb and VIa) that firms make more effective capital
budgeting decisions when they have more patents.
Firms may have widely cited patents because they (1) have
the resources to engage in cutting-edge technologies, (2) are more
visible, and (3) are more aggressive in defending their intellectual
property, prompting other firms to cite their patents diligently. On
the one hand, such patents may represent the successful completion
of larger innovation projects that require greater managerial over-
sight. On the other hand, such projects could signal the presence
of a large bureaucratic organization facing greater coordination chal-
lenges. We find significant evidence that among firms that underinvest,
large citations are associated with worse capital budgeting decisions
(Tables Va and Vb).
Weaker capital budgeting decisions are consistently and signifi-
cantly associated with leverage, regardless of whether the firm under-
or overinvests (Tables Va, Vb, and VIa). For firms that underinvest,
leverage may lead to additional supervision by external monitors
and thus exacerbate the underinvestment situation. For firms that
overinvest, high leverage may have resulted from excessive capital
spending by the firm. Although leverage may signal the presence
of external monitors, higher levels of cash flow may make internal
monitors more important. We find that capital budgeting decisions
are weakly improved by higher cash flow (Tables Va, Vb, and VIa).
Investment efficiency and industrial diversification appear to be weakly
Capital Budgeting and Information Sharing 1163
related, mainly among underinvesting firms. Among those firms that
overinvest we do not observe a consistent relationship between efficient
capital budgeting and industrial diversification. Other control variables
were statistically insignificant in all tests.
5.3 Implications
Despite the obvious differences among the four alternative measures
of information sharing, we find two consistent results. First, intrafirm
information sharing helps improve firms’ capital budgeting efficiency.
Second, the effects are asymmetric between over- and underinvesting
firms. This is useful for us to tease out the specific mechanisms behind
the data.
If the information barriers within firms make it difficult to make
appropriate investment decisions, and the managers are aware of
such difficulties, then a firm’s investment level should be randomly
distributed around the optimal level as the managers make their best
bets. Accordingly, better information sharing should reduce the margin
of error for both over- and underinvesting firms in a symmetric fashion.
Our empirical results do not support this scenario.
Instead, we find that better information sharing consistently
reduces overinvestment but has little effect on underinvestment, which
suggests that lack of information sharing led to inefficient investments in
the firm. In other words, the managers either underestimated intrafirm
information barriers, or did not take them into consideration when
making investment decisions. And because our study is focused on
geographic diversification rather than industry diversification, most of
the subsidiaries are horizontally differentiated.9 In such circumstances,
information barriers lead to more redundant investments than forgone
opportunities.
6. Average Q—Complementary Evidence
Unlike marginal q, average Tobin’s Q, the ratio of firm market value
to firm replacement value, reflects investors’ valuation of the firm.
Hayashi (1982) showed that with constant returns to scale and perfect
competition, marginal q and average Q should be equal. If information
sharing not only affects the quantity, but also raises the quality or
profitability of the investments, then we would expect a positive
association between intrafirm coordination and Tobin’s Q.
9. We calculate the technological proximity across subsidiaries following Jaffe (1986),
and find the mean distances within firms are much smaller than those across firms, even
in the same industry.
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We run four sets of tests of the following model
Qit = α + λXit + ηCit + ωISIC + δt Pt + εit, (5)
where X represents the four alternative independent variables used
to measure internal linkages, and C represents the firm-level control
variables. ISIC are industry fixed effects that capture each firm’s primary
two-digit SIC code, and Pt, a series of year fixed effects, are also
included to reflect the economic environment. Finally, we assume that
the disturbance term, εi , is normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance σ 2.
When we conducted our earlier tests where marginal q formed
part of the dependent variable, the dependent variable was estimated
over years 1. . .T and independent variables were the average value per
firm for the years 0. . .T – 1. Because average Q can be estimated directly
for each year, we now can use T observations for each firm in estimating
equation (5). Our dataset of 342 firms contains 224 underinvesting firms
and 118 overinvesting firms but we use simultaneously up to 2,663
observations on these 342 firms when examining variation in average
Q, excluding only those observations for which we have missing data.
Our results from estimation of equation (5) are shown in
Table VII. These results complement and mirror our earlier findings
regarding marginal q: firm valuation is higher when firms engage
in innovation activity that reflects stronger internal coordination and
communication. Thus, average Q is significantly higher when firms
cite their own patents, cite patents developed by colleagues in other
locations, and develop patents with researchers in multiple locations.
Similarly, average Q is significantly lower when examiner-imposed
self-citations are higher. Although the number of locations is not
significantly associated with the marginal q measure, average Q seems
to be higher when firms develop patents in more locations, a finding
that is consistent with the Morck and Yeung (1991) finding that investors
value multinationality if the firm possesses valuable intangible assets.
Investors also attach a premium to firms that develop more widely cited
patents, which proxy for firm-specific knowledge and intangible assets.
A second, potentially related robustness test is based on Wurgler
(2000). Wurgler estimates a country’s investment elasticity by measur-
ing the sensitivity of investment to value-added across industries. An
analogous measure in our context would reveal how swiftly capital
flows to the correct unit within a firm. Unfortunately, to obtain the
firm-level estimates of elasticity, we need unit-level data that we do
not have. Instead, we create a measure similar to Wurgler’s between-
year component of investment elasticity by regressing the growth in
firm assets on the growth in firm value over the years. As we have
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only 5–10 observations per firm, our estimated investment elasticities
are very noisy; just 24 of the 343 estimated elasticities are statistically
significant. We find that among those firms with negative investment
elasticities, firms respond better to market value changes when they
have higher self-citation ratios and lower levels of examiner-imposed
self-citations; this is consistent with the results reported in Tables Va
and VI. Unfortunately, the other results are mostly insignificant, which
is probably due to the small numbers of observations used in the first-
stage estimation of the elasticity.
7. Conclusion
Firms are increasingly conducting business on a global basis and
developing resources at different geographic locations. The additional
agency and information asymmetry problems arising from such organi-
zational structures often make it difficult for managers to make efficient
corporate capital budgeting decisions. We focus on firm heterogeneity
in the degree of internal information sharing, and examine whether the
efficiency of corporate capital budgeting decisions is associated with
stronger internal linkages.
Using marginal Tobin’s q to measure the efficiency of corporate
capital budgeting decisions and four alternative variables to measure
firms’ internal information sharing, we find consistent evidence that
firms with (1) higher internal citations, (2) frequent citations across
subsidiaries, (3) extensive use of interunit collaborations, and (4) smaller
percentage of examiner-imposed self-citations are more likely to avoid
inefficient investments from the corporation’s perspective. In addition,
by linking the same variables to average Tobin’s Q, we find that better
internal coordination is also positively associated with the overall
valuation of the R&D-active firms in our sample.
This study contributes to the economics and finance literature by
looking into the firm and identifying the sources of heterogeneity in
firms’ capital investment efficiency (Greene et al., 2009). Specifically,
efficiency in capital investment not only depends on the external
environment for information (Durnev et al., 2004), but also relates
to internal coordination and information sharing. Our study also
contributes to the management literature by showing that intrafirm
coordination is important not only for certain strategic goals such as
corporate innovation (Singh, 2008), but also for the overall financial
performance of firms.
Admittedly, there may be other factors in firms’ capital budgeting
decisions that cannot be fully incorporated into this study. For future
research, it would be interesting to have a closer look at the benefits
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and costs of strong internal linkages, and analyze whether firms with
different strategic imperatives or cost structures would choose specific
levels of interunit integration, which, in turn, affects the efficiency
of corporate budgeting. Another promising avenue to explore is the
nature of relationships among the divisions and subsidiaries in the
firm. Hansen (2002) suggests that a proper understanding of effective
interunit knowledge sharing in a multi-unit firm should take into
consideration relatedness in knowledge content among business units.
For instance, if investment inefficiencies are due to managers’ ignorance
of internal coordination problems, then managers in a horizontally
diversified firm may be more likely to make poor investments while
such managers in a vertically diversified firm may underinvest, missing
opportunities that reside in complementary assets within the firm. Un-
derstanding the nature of firm diversification will help us disentangle
the specific mechanisms underlying the inefficiencies and thus provide
better insights for practitioners.
Appendix
When estimating marginal q, the terms Vi,t and Ai,t are rewritten as:
Vi,t = Pt(CSi,t + PSi,t + LTDi,t + SDi,t − STAi,t), (A1)
Ai,t ≡ Ki,t + INVi,t + PtSTAi,t, (A2)
where
CSi,t = the market value of the outstanding common shares,
estimated as the number of common shares outstanding
(CRSP’s SHROUT) multiplied by the end of fiscal year price
(CRSP’s PRC).
PSi,t = the estimated market value of preferred shares outstanding
(Compustat’s Data19) over the Moody’s Baa preferred dividend
yield.10
LTDi,t = estimated market value of long-term debt (Data9).
SDi,t = book value of short-term debt, estimated as debt in current
liabilities (Data34), the total amount of short-term notes and
the current portion of long-term debt that is due in 1 year, less
the total amount of short-term notes (Data206).
10. These data are available online at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/
irates/baa.
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STAi,t = book value of short-term assets (Data4). STAi,t is included
in the estimation of firm assets, Ai,t, in order to reflect the
possibility of corporate spin-offs or divestitures.
Pt = inflation adjustment using the GDP deflator.11
Ki,t = estimated market value of PPE, which is calculated using
current and historical data on capital spending (Data7).
INV = estimated market value of inventories, calculated using total
inventory (Data3) and LIFO reserve (Data240). When a firm
uses FIFO accounting, inventory is Data3. However, when a
firm uses LIFO accounting, inventory is Data3 + Data240.
In equation (3) we estimate Di,t–1, disbursements to investors, as
the product di,tVi,t–1, with d capturing total cash disbursements, which
are estimated as the sum of cash dividends on common and preferred
stock (Data21 and Data19), purchases of common and preferred stock
(Data115),12 and interest expense (Data15).
The market value of PPE is calculated using a recursive algorithm
because historical cost accounting does not adjust properly for inflation.
All PP&E figures are converted to 1983 dollars,13 and we assume
straight-line depreciation of 10% per annum. PP&E in year t + 1 is
PP&E from year t less 10% depreciation plus current capital spending,
denoted Xi,t+1, which is deflated to 1983 dollars. We convert the data
to 1983 dollars using π t, the fractional change in the seasonally adjusted
producer price index (PPI) for finished goods published by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.14 More generally, we
use the recursive equation:
Ki,t+1 = (1 − δ)Ki,t + Xi,t+1∏t+1
τ=0 (1 + πτ )
. (A3)
When fewer than 10 years of historical observations are available
per firm, we begin the calculation with the first available year of data.
We exclude all firms for which we are unable to obtain at least five
historical observations. This procedure is necessary because historical
cost accounting can cause firm valuations of PP&E to be inaccurate if
simple deflators are used to adjust for inflation.
Average Q is estimated as Qit ≡ VitAit .
11. These data are available online at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/
ppi/ppifgs.
12. This is to capture share repurchases.
13. If the first observation for a firm is a different year, we use that as the firm’s base
year instead.
14. These data are available online at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/data/
ppi/ppifgs.
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